EOS Risk Group | Maritime Security Update

1 Μαΐου, 2026

Maritime Security Update for 01 May 2026:

RED SEA / GULF OF ADEN

EOS Intelligence – Standing Assessment: there are no confirmed indications that the Houthis intend to resume their attacks on shipping in the Gulf of Aden or Red Sea in the short term (<1 week), nor any evidence that (with Iran) they may attempt to control the flow of traffic via the Bab Al Mandeb Strait in the near term. Baseline risk to all vessels transiting the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden remains SUBSTANTIAL (3/5) but may increase to HIGH (4/5) with little to no notice in the short term (<1 week) if Iran resumes attacks / attempted attacks on critical infrastructure in the vicinity of Red Sea ports; and/or the Houthis attempt further attacks on land targets in Israel. Baseline risk to all vessels in the northern Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba remains MODERATE (2/5). EOS Risk Group continues to monitor and will implement a new target profile if new attacks are indicated as imminent. Commercial vessels have previously fit the Houthis’ target profile through the following criteria:

Vessels linked to Israel via flag, ownership structure or links to persons and companies based in Israel.
Vessels linked to fleets through the ownership structure which have called at ports in Israel (dates vary depending on implementation of this “phase of escalation”.
Vessels linked to the US via flag, ownership structure or links to persons and companies based in the United States.
Vessels linked to the UK via flag, ownership structure or links to persons and companies based in the United Kingdom.

MIDDLE EAST

The US President has been briefed by CENTCOM Commander Admiral Brad Cooper on a revised set of military options targeting Iran. Reported courses of action include limited duration but high intensity strikes against critical infrastructure, potential seizure or control of sections of the Strait of Hormuz, and special forces operations aimed at securing or neutralising Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpiles. These options indicate continued contingency planning for rapid escalation beyond the current ceasefire framework.

Iranian leadership has responded with calibrated strategic messaging. On National Persian Gulf Day, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei declared a “new chapter” in the management of the Strait of Hormuz and reaffirmed Iran’s intent to defend its nuclear and missile programmes. Concurrent reporting of air defence activity over southern Tehran suggests a heightened state of military readiness, likely linked to concerns over potential US or Israeli strike activity.

In parallel, US naval movements indicate a gradual reinforcement of regional posture. USS Boxer, a Wasp class amphibious assault ship, and USS Comstock, a Whidbey Island class dock landing ship, were observed transiting westbound through the Singapore Strait on 30 April. While publicly associated with humanitarian activity during transit, both platforms provide amphibious and expeditionary capability, including support to special operations forces, and are assessed to be repositioning toward the CENTCOM area of responsibility.

The United States has reached the statutory 60 day War Powers deadline requiring the President to either terminate military operations against Iran or seek Congressional authorisation to continue. The deadline follows US and Israeli strikes initiated on 28 February and subsequent escalation, including a sustained maritime blockade of Iranian ports and disruption to regional shipping lanes.

The Trump administration is currently positioning to avoid formal Congressional approval. Officials have stated that the ceasefire in effect since early April constitutes a termination or pause in hostilities, thereby suspending the legal requirement to seek authorisation. This interpretation is contested by Democrats and some Republicans, who assess that ongoing measures including the blockade still meet the threshold of continued hostilities.

Congress remains divided and has so far failed to pass any resolution either authorising or halting the conflict. Multiple War Powers votes have been blocked, largely along party lines, with limited bipartisan dissent emerging over constitutional concerns.

The situation is moving toward a legal and political inflection point rather than an immediate operational shift. The most likely course of action is that the administration continues operations under a contested legal interpretation rather than seeking formal approval. This sustains strategic ambiguity and preserves freedom of action in the Gulf, including continuation of the blockade.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: The United States is maintaining operational readiness for escalation while preserving optionality under the current ceasefire conditions. Iran is signalling deterrence, with emphasis on Hormuz control and strategic weapons protection, while elevating defensive posture around key assets. Short term escalation risk remains contained under the ceasefire framework. However, the absence of Congressional authorisation, combined with ongoing military posture in the Strait of Hormuz, increases the risk of rapid escalation if hostilities resume or enforcement actions intensify.

EOS Intelligence – Standing Assessment: The baseline risk to vessels in the Arabian Gulf remains SUBSTANTIAL (3/5) (an incident is a credible possibility) due to the 08 April US/Iran ceasefire negotiated via Pakistani intermediaries and extended unilaterally by the Trump administration (keeping the US ‘blockade’ of Iran-associated shipping in place). This risk level remains extant as of 2100UTC on 29 April, but in the context of fragile security environment has the potential to escalate in the short term (<1 week). The risk for vessels attempting Strait of Hormuz transits without Iranian approval (obtained by government-to-government agreement) is assessed as EXTREME (an incident is highly likely). The risk for vessels attempting Strait of Hormuz transits with Iranian approval is assessed as HIGH (an incident is likely), due to the potential for misunderstanding, miscalculation and mistaken targeting.

ASIA-PACIFIC

On 30 April, China conducted naval and air ‘combat readiness patrols’ around Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, supported by coast guard vessels operating in the same area. The activity took place alongside ongoing multinational exercises involving the US and the Philippines, and was framed by China as a response to what it characterised as destabilising external military activity. Philippine authorities rejected this characterisation and reiterated their position on sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the area.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: The patrols demonstrate continued Chinese intent to assert control over contested maritime space and signal opposition to US-aligned military activity in the region. This type of activity will almost certainly continue in the short to medium term (<1 month), with escalation possible as a function of the proximity of opposing units rather than deliberate efforts to escalate. While not indicative of imminent confrontation, the persistence of such operations increases the risk of miscalculation in a highly congested and contested operating environment.

WEST AFRICA

On 29 April, Nigeria and regional partners concluded Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS 2026, a multinational maritime security exercise conducted across the Gulf of Guinea. The exercise involved West and Central African navies alongside international partners, focusing on coordinated responses to piracy, armed robbery at sea, illegal fishing, oil theft, and narcotics trafficking. Activities included live interdiction drills, visit, board, search and seizure operations, and information-sharing exercises designed to improve regional maritime domain awareness and interoperability between participating forces.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: OBANGAME EXPRESS included significant international participation including the US Navy (as lead sponsor through US AFRICOM); the exercise is an indication of regional commitment to collective maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. Improved coordination and information sharing would highly likely enhance response capability against opportunistic and organised maritime crime, particularly oil theft and trafficking, which remain persistent threats. However, the exercise’s impact is likely to be limited in the longer term. Enduring constraints including funding shortfalls, lack of established multilateral C3ISR mechanisms and a regional focus on land-based terrorist threats will highly likely continue to hamper long-term, enduring effectiveness.

BLACK SEA / RUSSIA

Overnight on 30 April – 01 May 2026, according to local reports, a Ukrainian drone strike targeted the Port of Tuapse on Russia’s Black Sea coast, marking the fourth attack on the port within a week and resulting in a fire at the sea terminal. The port has been repeatedly targeted in recent days, particularly its oil and fuel infrastructure, with the incident occurring under an ongoing state of emergency following earlier strikes. (NEW)

On 29 April, Ukrainian military intelligence stated that naval drones struck the Cameroon-flagged tanker MARQUISE (IMO 9315745) approximately 210 km southeast of Tuapse in the Black Sea. Ukrainian sources stated the vessel had its AIS transponder switched off, was drifting in international waters, and was likely preparing for a ship-to-ship transfer operation. They further stated that the strike damaged the stern area and engine-room section, leaving the tanker unable to manoeuvre. At the time of reporting, no cargo was declared on board and no casualties were publicly confirmed.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: Ukraine’s ability to target Russian-associated tankers in the Black Sea and more widely is well proven. This attack is consistent with Ukraine’s strategy of degrading all elements of Russia’s energy economy, from extraction through transportation, refining, storage and transport to export customers. If MARQUISE was positioned for a ship-to-ship transfer with AIS disabled, it would fit common shadow-fleet practices used to obscure cargo origin, ownership chains, or destination routing. Statistics continue to indicate that vessels in ballast are more likely to be attacked than laden tankers, likely due to Ukrainian intent to minimise the environmental impact of strikes in the Black Sea and elsewhere.

LIBYA

On 30 April, Libyan authorities and the Red Crescent reported that a migrant vessel broke down off Libya’s eastern coast, drifting for several days before a recovery operation. A patrol boat, operating alongside naval and coastguard units, recovered 17 bodies and rescued seven survivors, with additional persons reported missing. The operation lasted several hours and took place within Libya’s search and rescue zone in the central Mediterranean.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: The maritime risk environment off Libya is currently dominated by irregular migration flows rather than maritime crime or interstate maritime conflict. Fatalities linked to migrant departures remain likely in the short to medium term (<1 month), particularly given the persistent use of unseaworthy vessels and limited Libyan and regional surveillance and search-and-rescue capabilities. While Libya’s coastguard and affiliated units remain active, their operations are focused primarily on interception and recovery rather than broader maritime security enforcement.

LATAM

On 29 April, Spanish authorities reported the seizure of approximately 120kg of cocaine concealed within timber cargo shipped from Suriname, intercepted in containers on arrival in Spain. The shipment originated in northern South America and was identified through port inspection and intelligence-led targeting, highlighting continued use of legitimate commercial cargo flows to move narcotics from Latin America into Europe.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: This seizure reinforces the continued dominance of containerised maritime trafficking routes from northern South America into European ports, particularly via relatively low-profile export commodities such as timber or perishables such as bananas. The use of Suriname-linked cargo indicates a degree of diversification away from traditional Colombian/Brazilian export hubs, a trend that is likely to continue in the short to medium term (<1 month) although the link to US disruption in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific is hard to quantify. While this is an overseas interception, the Latin American origin underlines that regional maritime trafficking networks remain highly active and adaptable, with detection heavily dependent on intelligence-led targeting achieved through international cooperation.

REST OF THE WORLD

On 30 April, Israeli naval forces intercepted multiple vessels from the Global Sumud Flotilla in international waters near Crete, boarding and diverting a significant portion of the convoy attempting to reach Gaza. The flotilla, comprising dozens of vessels carrying activists, was stopped several hundred nautical miles from the Israeli coastline, with reports indicating that around 20 vessels were taken under control and crews detained. Israeli authorities stated that the action was undertaken to enforce the maritime blockade of Gaza, while organisers reported communications disruption and contested the legality of the interception.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: The interception demonstrates Israel’s willingness to enforce its maritime blockade at extended range, significantly beyond its immediate littoral, and is likely intended to deter future flotilla attempts. Similar activist-led maritime challenges are likely in the medium term (<1 month), with interception assessed as almost certain given established Israeli policy. The operation increases legal and reputational risk for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean, and escalation remains a realistic possibility if future flotillas involve larger participation or state-backed elements.

SOMALI PIRACY

Since 21 April 2026, at least four confirmed piracy incidents have been reported off the northern Somali coast, comprising three vessel hijackings and one dhow seizure, with multiple associated suspicious approaches. M/T HONOUR 25 (IMO 1099735) was hijacked on 21 April and remains under pirate control, while the dhow ALKHARY 2 was seized shortly prior and released on 22 April, with the Pirate Action Group assessed to have transferred to HONOUR 25. On 26 April, M/V SWARD (IMO 9174244) was hijacked in position 07°13’N 049°32’E and also remains under the control of armed individuals. A separate dhow hijacking occurred on 25 April approximately 10 nautical miles off Dhinowda, Somalia, and is assessed as linked. All incidents are being actively monitored by EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, with both SWARD and HONOUR 25 still held. In addition, at least one suspicious approach has been reported approximately 500 nautical miles east of Mogadishu, indicating expanding operational reach. The pattern reflects an organised Pirate Action Group operating from Puntland waters, demonstrating the capability to conduct successive hijackings and utilise captured vessels as support platforms.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: As of 28 April, the risk of piracy in Somali waters has increased to HIGH (an incident is likely) at <400nm offshore and SUBSTANTIAL (an incident is a realistic possibility) at <600nm offshore. At least one Pirate Action Group (PAG) is likely active in waters off Puntland, Somaliland and / or the Somali coast in the vicinity of Eyl, where weather conditions remain suitable for offshore operations – particularly using a dhow / fishing vessel ‘mothership’ – and oversight by maritime security forces remains effective but limited.

On 28 April at 1600 UTC, UKMTO has received a report of an incident 500NM east of Mogadishu, Somalia. The Master of a tanker was approached by a PAG whilst transiting south through the Indian Ocean. A larger wooden vessel crossed ahead of the tanker at 1nm. The Master then reported that two additional craft approached from the starboard side and closed to within 400 meters. Upon sighting the vessels armed sentries, both small craft and the mothership turned away.
On 26 April, time not confirmed, the St Kitts and Nevis-flagged general cargo vessel SWARD was boarded by armed suspected Somali pirates while operating off the Puntland coast of Somalia, at an approximate position north-east of Garacad in the vicinity of 10° 18′ N, 049° 22′ E (exact boarding position not officially confirmed). According to incident details reported by maritime security sources including UKMTO, EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and regional monitors, the vessel was reported hijacked and subsequently directed towards the Somali coast. The vessel was carrying a crew reported as 15 personnel, comprising 13 Syrian nationals and 2 Indian nationals. EUNAVFOR ATALANTA forces are investigating.
On 23 April the Master of a cargo ship reported that the vessel was approached by two small craft with armed persons onboard, while underway 83nm SE of Eyl, Somalia. One small craft approached within 660m, warning shots were fired and the craft returned fire. The small craft moved away and cleared the area; all crew are safe and accounted for.
On 21 April at 1140UTC, crude oil tanker HONOUR 25 (IMO: 1099735) reported a boarding by six pirates aboard four small craft, armed with AK-47 and RPG, at approximate position 10 03 N, 051 27E. There was no report of any mothership nearby. The tanker’s crew (of Pakistan and Sri Lanka nationality) retreated into the vessel’s citadel. As of 25 April, HONOUR 25 is being monitored by EUNAVFOR ATALANTA assets and is assessed to no pose and active threat to other vessels in the area.
On 20 April, time not confirmed, a Somali-flagged fishing vessel (the ALKHARY 2) was boarded by 11, armed pirates while operating in waters off Xaafuun, Somalia, at an approximate position of 10° 25′ N, 051° 37′ E. As of 22 April, ALKHARY 2 has been reported released with all crew unharmed; the PAG may have used ALKHARY 2 as a platform to approach and board HONOUR 25.
As at 13 April reports of a Pirate Action Group in the vicinity of Bargal, northern Somalia (reported 09 April) have been re-assessed as activity by local maritime security personnel and therefore pose no threat to commercial vessels in the area.
Operation ATALANTA reported the successful liberation of the dhow AL WASEEMI 786 on 05 April, which was hijacked by a Pirate Action Group (PAG) on 25 March approximately 400NM E of Mogadishu. All crew reported safe and the PAG assessed to no longer pose a threat to commercial vessels in the area.

On 26 February reporting by Puntland Maritime Police Force indicated that suspected pirates had been sighted operating two skiffs (known locally as LAYLO and SHABAX), which departed from the coastal area of Garmaal and attempted to attack a fishing dhow from Iran on the high seas, possibly with the intent to hijack it. The crew aboard the dhow were reported to have mounted a strong resistance; one attacker was killed in the incident and two injured. The attacking group later fled toward the shore in the vicinity of Eyl. Local police are investigating.
On 30 January a vessel reported being approached to within 0.3NM by one skiff with five persons onboard while transiting off Mogadishu. The skiff matched the vessel speed and course, even after the change of vessel course and speed, for 20 minutes before departing. Vessel and crew were reported safe.

EOS Intelligence Assessment: Conditions remain favourable for PAG operations offshore Somalia. It is likely that the two incidents reported on 21 and 23 April are connected (i.e. same attacking group). Baseline risk to commercial vessels remains SUBSTANTIAL (3/5) up to 600NM from the eastern coast of Somalia; vessels should transit no less than 400NM from the Somali coast – even with an Armed Security Team (AST) embarked – as increased proximity to the Somali coast increases the risk of incident. Vessels are particularly vulnerable to boardings / attack if transiting or operating with freeboards under 10M at speeds less than 15KTS. An embarked AST is strongly recommended for transits within the 400-600NM range. Transits past 600NM range have a MODERATE (2/5) risk and do not require an AST. An embarked AST is recommended for all transits in the Gulf of Aden. All-round visual and radar watch should be maintained at all times when operating inside the HRA, with closing contacts identified at maximum practical range. All closing contacts should be monitored closely to CPA, with visual search at maximum practical range for PAG equipment (skiffs, small arms, ladders).

SHORT-TERM FORECAST (<1 WEEK)

Regional conflict may resume in the Middle East in the short term (<1 week), with commensurate risk to shipping, ports and energy terminals across the region.
Electronic interference to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman likely will remain elevated.
The Houthis may resume their attacks on commercial shipping, in support of Iran.
Groups in Iraq, Lebanon and other locations where non-state actors are supportive of Iran may attempt long-range strikes against Israel and/or opportunistic strikes against locations of significance for US operations in the region.
Somali piracy will remain a threat in the Somali Basin (and possibly the Gulf of Aden) while weather conditions remain suitable for PAG operations.
Maritime crime will remain a threat in the Singapore Strait and Phillip Channel, particularly for vessels transiting the eastbound traffic lane of the Traffic Separation Scheme at night.
Russia will continue to target ports and critical infrastructure in Ukraine which may increase the risk of further reprisal attacks on Russia’s Black Sea ports by Ukraine.