Intermodal Report Week 30 2026
Παρακάτω θα βρείτε την Έκθεση Διατροπικών Μεταφορών – Εβδομάδα 30 2026
Έκθεση Διατροπικών Μεταφορών Εβδομάδα 30 2026
Market Insight
By Nikos Tagoulis, Senior Analyst
The Middle East conflict entered a new phase following the
Houthis’ imposition of a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia, adding to geopolitical uncertainty. Beyond attacks on vessels, recent
reports that a Houthi strike forced the 400,000-bpd Jazan oil refinery to halt operations demonstrate that the Houthis are also
willing to target energy infrastructure.
This escalation comes at a time when Saudi Arabia increasingly
relies on its west coast to maintain commodity exports following
the disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Seaborne
crude oil exports through Yanbu doubled in Q2 2026, reflecting
increased flows through the East–West pipeline as the Kingdom
sought to bypass Hormuz.
Against this backdrop, tanker shipping faces the most immediate
exposure. For Saudi crude exports, the effects would differ by
destination. European cargoes would remain largely unaffected,
as they already move north through the Suez Canal. By contrast,
the consequences would be considerably greater for barrels destined for Asia and the Indian subcontinent via Bab el-Mandeb. To
avoid the Gulf of Aden, vessels would have to sail north through
Suez before rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, extending
voyages to approximately 2.5 times their normal length, adding
tonne-miles and increasing voyage costs.
Such rerouting would tighten prompt vessel availability and push
spot rates higher, while increased use of the Suez Canal would
provide further support for Suezmax demand. VLCCs would have
to transit Suez partially laden, potentially requiring STS lightering
and resulting in greater operational complexity and longer transit
times.
Given the above, the strategic importance of the SUMED pipeline,
and of Egypt more broadly as an oil transshipment hub, increases
The pipeline connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean, and
Saudi Arabia would be expected to send greater crude volumes to
Ain Sukhna port for transportation through SUMED to Sidi Kerir
on the Mediterranean coast. From there, cargoes could continue
to Asian markets via the Cape of Good Hope, providing an alternative route that avoids disruptions in both Hormuz and Bab elMandeb.
Moreover, energy-security considerations could lead importers to
diversify away from the Middle East and seek alternative suppliers, reshuffling energy trade. Demand could shift towards the
United States, Brazil and West Africa, while Russian crude flows
to China and the Indian subcontinent could strengthen further.
For the oil-products segment, the reported attack on refinery infrastructure is particularly concerning. If such strikes persist and
cause broader disruption to output and exports, they would compound the effects of Russia’s ban on diesel exports, further constraining seaborne oil-product export volumes and heightening
energy-security concerns. Should Saudi refinery operations remain close to normal levels, the more immediate consequence
would likely be a redirection of trade flows. Eastbound shipments
from Saudi Red Sea ports would become materially less competitive, shifting a larger share of Saudi fuel volumes towards Europe.
Outside the tanker segment, the impact would be less pronounced. In dry bulk, grain shipments moving via Mediterranean
and Suez into the Red Sea would be less affected, unless Houthi
attacks on infrastructure escalate. By contrast, steel trade would
be more exposed, given that a substantial share of steel products
originates in China and transits Bab el-Mandeb.
For containerships, the Houthi move primarily interrupts the segment’s cautious steps towards returning to the Red Sea. Regionally, Jeddah is exposed because of its growing transshipment role
and participation in Gulf feeder networks. More broadly, the continuation of diversions via the Cape of Good Hope, which tie up
active capacity in an otherwise oversupplied segment, is expected
to remain supportive of freight rates.
In conclusion, the threat of Houthi action disrupting Red Sea trade
marks a significant escalation in the Middle East crisis and poses
a material threat to regional navigation and trade. If it causes
broader disruption to energy flows, the consequences could extend to the global macroeconomic outlook by intensifying energysecurity concerns, raising energy costs, adding to inflationary
pressures and weighing on global trade and economic growth
