MIDDLE EAST
On 06 May, US forces disabled and seized the Iranian-flagged tanker HASNA after it reportedly ignored repeated warnings to stop and continued towards an Iranian port in breach of the ongoing US naval blockade. According to CENTCOM statements, an F/A-18 Super Hornet launched from USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN fired 20mm cannon rounds into the vessel’s rudder, disabling steering but reportedly avoiding casualties or a major pollution incident. US officials stated that HASNA was an unladen tanker and that the strike was intended to stop rather than sink the vessel.
On 07 May, three US Navy guided-missile destroyers (USS TRUXTUN, USS MASON and USS RAFAEL PERALTA) transited the Strait of Hormuz as part of ongoing US efforts to maintain commercial navigation through the waterway under ‘Project Freedom’. During the transit, US Central Command stated that the destroyers came under coordinated attack involving Iranian missiles, drones and IRGC Navy fast attack craft, prompting the warships and supporting aircraft to conduct defensive engagements and retaliatory ‘self-defence strikes’ against Iranian military infrastructure around Bandar Abbas and Qeshm Island. US officials stated that none of the destroyers were hit or damaged during the engagement.
Unverified reporting suggests a degree of UAE enabling / logistic involvement in the strikes on Iranian land targets. Reports of UAE fighter aircraft conducting strike activity are not supported by verified evidence, but it is highly likely that US air-to-air refuelling (AAR) aircraft operating out of UAE air bases and orbiting in UAE airspace have supported the strikes. Unverified reporting of 07 May suggests that UAE air defences were active in responding to Iranian drone / missile threats, but there are no reports of successful strikes or collateral damage at this time.
EOS Intelligence Assessment: The HASNA incident represents a further escalation in the increasingly aggressive US enforcement posture around the Hormuz blockade regime, and appears to be the first confirmed instance during the current crisis of a US carrier-based fast jet directly engaging a commercial tanker with cannon fire. Although the strike was calibrated to disable rather than destroy the vessel, the incident will highly likely increase the likelihood of reciprocal Iranian action against commercial shipping in the short term (<1 week).
The situation surrounding the Iranian-flagged container vessel TOUSKA (IMO: 9328900) also remains unresolved. TOUSKA was seized by US forces on 19 April after USS SPRUANCE reportedly disabled the vessel’s propulsion with naval gunfire before US Marines boarded and secured the vessel during blockade enforcement operations. Recent reporting indicates that some crew members have since been repatriated to Iran via Pakistan, with unconfirmed reporting that the vessel will be moved to Pakistani TTW for eventual return to Iran ‘after necessary repairs’. Tehran has continued to describe the seizure as ‘armed piracy’ and a ceasefire violation.
Iranian officials and affiliated media have repeatedly accused Gulf states – particularly the UAE – of facilitating or supporting US military operations in the region, especially through defence cooperation and access arrangements linked to US and allied forces. The UAE has been subject to the most Iranian airstrikes of all the Gulf states since the conflict began on 28 Feb. Iran will highly likely view the UAE as complicit in the latest strikes, if not directly involved in conducting airstrikes.
The risk of Iranian reprisal strikes on all UAE port and infrastructure targets has increased to HIGH (an incident is likely) with immediate effect.
Attacks may occur without warning. There is now HIGH risk of direct attack and collateral damage due to falling debris throughout the UAE.
There is now HIGH risk of direct attack or collateral damage to commercial vessels in UAE territorial waters and adjacent areas.
The attacks on the transiting US Navy destroyers highlight the low probability of meaningful Naval escort operations for transiting commercial vessels in the short term (<1 week). While warships are fully occupied defending themselves against multi-axis attack by multiple weapon systems, they will have little or no capacity to defend any vessels they are escorting. The layered air cover used during the escort / guidance of two Maersk vessels on 04 May was effective but complex and force-intensive, and highly likely cannot be replicated for regular escort at scale.
The IRGCN likely has a decreasing number of small fast attack craft available for operations in the Strait of Hormuz. Given their ineffectiveness against US Navy warships and the attrition they have suffered in the last few days, the IRGCN will likely conserve the vessels it has left for harassment or boarding operations against commercial vessels, conducting any future attacks against US or Allied warships using drones and missiles.
RED SEA / GULF OF ADEN
Baseline risk to all vessels transiting the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden remains SUBSTANTIAL (3/5) but may increase to HIGH (4/5) in the short term (<1 week) if credible intelligence indicates that a Pirate Action Group (PAG) is active in the Gulf of Aden.
EOS Risk Group continues to monitor and will implement a new target profile if a resumption of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping becomes more likely. Commercial vessels have previously fit the Houthis’ target profile through the following criteria:
Vessels linked to Israel via flag, ownership structure or links to persons and companies based in Israel.
Vessels linked to fleets through the ownership structure which have called at ports in Israel (dates vary depending on implementation of this “phase of escalation”.
Vessels linked to the US via flag, ownership structure or links to persons and companies based in the United States.
Vessels linked to the UK via flag, ownership structure or links to persons and companies based in the United Kingdom.
PIRACY
SOMALI PIRACY
Recent incidents:
On 2 May, tanker EUREKA (IMO: 1022823) was reported hijacked by a group of unidentified armed men approximately 60NM SW of Al Mukallah in the Gulf of Aden, likely taken towards Bosaso, Somalia. Local reporting from northern Somalia later indicated the attacking group had departed from Caluula, 190km E of Bosaso.
On 28 April, the Master of a tanker was approached by a PAG while in transit 500NM east of Mogadishu, Somalia. A larger wooden vessel crossed ahead of the tanker at 1NM; two other craft approached from the starboard side and closed to within 400m. Upon sighting the tanker’s armed guards, both small craft and the mothership turned away.
On 26 April, general cargo vessel SWARD (IMO 9174244) was boarded by a group of 9 attackers while operating off the Puntland coast of Somalia, NE of Garacad in the vicinity of 10° 18′ N, 049° 22′ E (exact boarding position not officially confirmed). According to incident details reported by maritime security sources including UKMTO, EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA and regional monitors, the vessel was reported hijacked and subsequently directed towards the Somali coast. The vessel was carrying a crew reported as 15 personnel, comprising 13 Syrian nationals and 2 Indian nationals.
On 23 April, the Master of a cargo ship reported that the vessel was approached by two small craft with armed persons onboard, while underway 83nm SE of Eyl, Somalia. One small craft approached within 660m, warning shots were fired and the craft returned fire. The small craft moved away and cleared the area; all crew are safe and accounted for.
On 21 April, crude oil tanker HONOUR 25 (IMO: 1099735) reported a boarding by six pirates aboard four small craft, armed with AK-47 and RPG, at approximate position 10 03 N, 051 27E. There was no report of any mothership nearby. The tanker’s crew (of Pakistan and Sri Lanka nationality) retreated into the vessel’s citadel. As of 25 April, HONOUR 25 is being monitored by EUNAVFOR ATALANTA assets and is assessed to no pose and active threat to other vessels in the area.
On 20 April, a Somali-flagged fishing vessel (the ALKHARY 2) was boarded by 11, armed pirates while operating in waters off Xaafuun, Somalia, at an approximate position of 10° 25′ N, 051° 37′ E. As of 22 April, ALKHARY 2 has been reported released with all crew unharmed; the PAG may have used ALKHARY 2 as a platform to approach and board HONOUR 25.
EOS Intelligence Assessment: All recent incidents off the NE coast are being actively monitored by EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, with both SWARD and HONOUR 25 still held by Somalis. At least one suspicious approach has been reported approximately 500 NM E of Mogadishu, indicating expanding operational reach. Incidents during the past week indicate at least one organised Pirate Action Group (PAG) operating from Puntland. Risk of piracy in Somali waters has increased to HIGH (an incident is likely) at <400nm offshore and SUBSTANTIAL (an incident is a realistic possibility) at <600nm offshore. At least one Pirate Action Group (PAG) is likely active in waters off Puntland, Somaliland and / or the Somali coast in the vicinity of Eyl, where weather conditions remain suitable for offshore operations – particularly using a dhow / fishing vessel ‘mothership’ – and oversight by maritime security forces remains effective but limited. Vessels should transit no less than 400NM from the Somali coast – even with an Armed Security Team (AST) embarked – as increased proximity to the Somali coast increases the risk of incident. Vessels are particularly vulnerable to boardings / attack if transiting or operating with freeboards under 10M at speeds less than 15KTS. An embarked AST is strongly recommended for transits within the 400-600NM range. Transits past 600NM range have a MODERATE (2/5) risk and do not require an AST. An embarked AST is recommended for all transits in the Gulf of Aden. All-round visual and radar watch should be maintained at all times when operating inside the HRA, with closing contacts identified at maximum practical range. All closing contacts should be monitored closely to CPA, with visual search at maximum practical range for PAG equipment (skiffs, small arms, ladders).
Activity Type
Running Total
Amplifying Information
Commercial Vessels Hijacked/Boarded
EUREKA: reported hijacked on 02 May 60NM SW of Al Mukallah in the Gulf of Aden
HONOUR 25: reported hijacked on 21 April, IVO Xaafun, NE Somalia
SWARD: reported hijacked on
HELLAS APHRODITE: Boarded on 06 Nov 2025, PAG could not breach citadel, departed.
BASILISK: Boarded on 23 May 2024, freed by Spanish warship the same day.
ABDULLAH: Hijacked on 12 March 2024 and freed by ransom on 13 April 2024.
LILA NORFOLK: Hijacked on 04 January 2024 but freed by the Indian Navy shortly after.
RUEN: Hijacked on 14 December 2023 – freed by Indian Navy on 16 March.
Suspicious Approaches and Sightings
STOLT SAGALAND: attempted boarding/suspicious approach reported 03 November 2025.
AL THUMAMA: Suspicious approach on 07 November 2025.
Fired Upon
Dhow/Fishing Vessels Hijacked
Up to 29
Hijack of ALKHARY 2, 20 April 2026.
At least one Dhow hijacked in international waters, others in the Somali TTW and EEZ.
Possible hijack attempt reported 26 February 2026.
Hijacking of ALWASEEMI 786 reported on 25 March 2026. Dhow liberated by Op ATALANTA on 05 April.
Dhows in Pirate Possession
Up to 7
Risk of motherships blending in with normal maritime pattern of life = possible reduced warning time.
